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1 Introduction
International tax authorities have become increasingly aware of the possible use of
transfer prices as a device for shifting prots into low tax jurisdictions. Transfer
pricing policies have important implications since exports and imports from related
parties are a dominant portion of trade ows see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009).
In order to discourage tax shifting activities by multinational rms, most countries
follow taxation policies that are based on the OECDs Transfer Pricing Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which recommend that, for
tax purposes, internal pricing policies be consistent with the Arms Length Principle
(ALP); i.e., that transfer prices between companies of multinational enterprises for
tax purposes be established on a market value basis, thus comparable to transactions
between independent (unrelated) parties.1 Tax authorities from all OECD member
nations rely on the ALP to protect their revenue base by preventing incomes shifting
from one country to another for reasons unrelated to the economic nature of the
transactions.
Hirshleifer (1956) showed that the application of the ALP is inconsequential un-
der perfect competition. The simplest version of Hirshleifers (1956) model assumes
a decentralized rm consisting of a headquarter (HQ) and two divisions (s and b).
Division s (seller or the upstream division) produces an intermediate product and
supplies it to division b (the buyer or the downstream division). The buyer processes
the intermediate product and sells it in the nal product market. Both divisions
maximize prot ignoring the potentially negative consequences of their decisions for
other division, or the rm as a whole. The problem of HQ consists of nding a trans-
fer pricing policy that coordinates the decisions of the two independent divisions so
that consolidated prots are maximized. The e¢ cient level of internal trade can be
implemented by setting transfer prices at the opportunity cost of the intermediate
1Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations, OECD Pub-
lishing Service 2010. Of course, rms are free to charge their subsidiaries either the same or di¤erent
prices to those used for tax purposes (i.e., to may use either one set or two sets of books.) Lemus
(2011) provides an analysis of the rmsstrategic incentives to use either one set or two sets of books,
and shows that for a subset of the parameter space maintaining one set of books is an equilibrium.
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product. If there is a competitive market for the intermediate product, the oppor-
tunity cost of the intermediate product is equal to the market price. If no market
exists, the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate prod-
uct. Thus, setting the transfer price equal to the market price is consistent with the
Arms Length Principle, and leads to an e¢ cient allocation of resources. Hirshleifers
result depends crucially on the assumption that the intermediate market is perfectly
competitive. As we shall see, under imperfect competition the ALP signicantly
distorts the resource allocation as well as rmstax liabilities.
In this paper, abstracting from tax considerations arising due to di¤erences on tax
rates in each jurisdiction, we examine the consequences of adopting transfer pricing
policies adhering to the ALP under imperfect competition and vertical separation.2
In our setting parents compete in quantities in a home market and, either directly or
indirectly via their output choices, set the prices at which they sell the good to their
subsidiaries, which in turn compete in quantities an external market. As customary,
we assume that parents maximize consolidated prots, while subsidiaries maximize
their own prots.3
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that views regulatory constraints as impedi-
ments to e¤ective management, our results suggest that regulatory restrictions forcing
a parent to set the transfer price at market value may serve as a precommitting device,
thus playing a strategic role benecial to rms: the Arms Length Principle serves to
credibly convey to external parties that the related party price is above marginal cost,
ensuring commitment and observability. Thus, the Arms Length Principle provides
a rational for vertical separation under quantity competition.
2In the absence of the ALP, it has been established that vertical separation (i.e., delegation)
intensies or alleviates competition depending on the nature of oligopolistic competition: When rms
compete in prices, vertical separation softens competition, whereas when rms compete in quantities
vertical separation induces rms to compete more aggressively see Vickers (1985), Fershtman and
Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Alles and Datar (1998). Göx (2000) and Dürr and Göx (2011) show
that when rms compete in prices, the ALP reinforces the e¤ect of vertical separation in softening
competition.
3Clearly, if parents do not delegate but rather compete in quantities in the external market as
well, then in equilibrium rms produces their Cournot output in each market, and transfer pricing
policies are irrelevant.
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In our framework there are two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market
and the Greek market. There are two rms competing à la Cournot in the Latin
market. These rms have subsidiaries, which in turn compete à la Cournot in the
Greek market. We begin by considering two alternative transfer pricing schemes for
intrarm transactions. Since competition in the Latin market provides a market price
to impose on comparable market transactions, we study market based transfer pricing
(MB) as the equivalent to the ALP as OECD recommends. Alternatively, we consider
transfer pricing not linked to the intermediate product market, i.e., non-market based
transfer pricing (NMB). We show that MB transfer pricing typically leads to a lower
total surplus, and may lead to larger prots, than NMB transfer pricing.
Under NMB transfer pricing a parents decisions of how much to produce in the
Latin market and what transfer price to charge to its subsidiary are independent. In
equilibrium, parents set transfer prices below marginal cost in an attempt to gain a
Stackelberg advantage in the Greek market; i.e., both parents act in a Stackelberg
fashion. The equilibrium output in the Greek market is greater than the Cournot out-
put, and consolidated prot is below the sum of the prots at the Cournot equilibria
of both markets. These results reproduce those of Vickers (1985) in our framework.
Under MB transfer pricing a parent must transfer the good to its subsidiary at
the Latin market price. Hence, a parent output decision must internalize its impact
on the transfer price of its subsidiary, and its subsidiarys rival. MB transfer pricing
thus provides parents with an instrument to soften competition in the Greek market.
Since a parent inuences its transfer price via its output decision in the Latin market,
competition may be more aggressive in this market. Thus, total prot under MB
transfer pricing may be above that under NMB transfer pricing. Hence the Arms
Length Principle may provide a rational for vertical separation. However, total surplus
under MB transfer pricing is typically below that under NMB transfer pricing, which
raises some questions about the use of the ALP as a guideline for regulating transfer
prices.
We also consider the consequences of applying the ALP less than rigorously by
studying a variation of the model of MB transfer pricing where parents may introduce
discounts. Under this scheme of market based transfer pricing with discounts (MBD)
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each parent can compensate the e¤ect of a high price in the Latin market on its
subsidiarys cost by applying a discount. Discounts open up the possibility to gain
a Stackelberg advantage in the Greek market, bringing back the kind of prisoners
dilemma that rms face under NMB transfer pricing. However, whereas under MBD
transfer pricing the equilibrium output in the Greek market is the same as under NMB
transfer pricing, the equilibrium output in the Latin market is less competitive under
MBD transfer pricing than under NMB transfer pricing: a parent has an incentive to
increase the price in the Latin market by reducing its output and at the same time
increase the discount to its subsidiary, thus increasing its subsidiarys rival transfer
price without a¤ecting that transfer price of its own subsidiary. These incentives lead
to a smaller output in the Latin market and to a smaller total surplus than under
NMB.
In summary, a transfer pricing policy consistent with the Arms Length Principle
is likely to induce a surplus loss relative to NMB transfer pricing, whether it is applied
rigorously or not. Thus, contrary to common wisdom based on competitive models,
under imperfect competition the adoption of the ALP is non neutral, but has an
signicant impact on market outcomes as it softens competition either in the external
market (when it is applied rigorously) or in the home market (when its application
is more lax).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup. Section 3
derives results for NMB transfer pricing. Section 4 provides an equilibrium analysis
of MB transfer pricing, and compares the properties of equilibrium under the two
transfer pricing schemes. Section 5 studies the impact of introducing discounts in the
MB transfer pricing scheme. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and Preliminaries
A good is sold in two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market and the
Greek market. The inverse demands in the Latin and Greek markets are pd(q) =
max f0; a  bqg and d() = max f0;   g ; respectively, where a; b; ; and  are
positive real numbers. Assuming that demands are linear facilitates the analysis and
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makes it easier to interpret the results. Comparing the constant terms in each de-
mand (i.e., the parameters a and ) allows us to consider the impact of di¤erences
in the maximum willingness to pay in each market. The parameter u := a= is a
proxy for the maximum willingness to pay in the Latin market relative to that of the
Greek market. Di¤erences in the slope of the demands (i.e., of the parameters b and
) capture the impact of di¤erences in the market size the demand is greater the
smaller the slope. The parameter s := =b is a proxy for the size of Greek market
relative to that of the Latin market.
There are two rms producing the good at same constant marginal cost, which
is assumed to be zero without loss of generality. Firms compete à la Cournot in the
Latin market, and have subsidiaries which in turn compete à la Cournot in the Greek
market. Each subsidiary receives the good from its parent rm at a transfer price.
Parent rms seek to maximize consolidated prots; since the cost of production is
zero, the consolidated prots are just the sum of the revenues of the parent and the
subsidiary. A subsidiary maximizes its own prot, which is the di¤erence between its
revenue and its cost. A subsidiaryunit cost is just its transfer price. We identify the
parent and subsidiary rms with the same subindex i 2 f1; 2g:
Given the outputs of parents (q1; q2) and subsidiaries (1; 2) the consolidated
prot of parent i 2 f1; 2g is
i(q1; q2; 1; 2) = p
d(q1 + q2)qi + 
d(1 + 2)i:
In the Cournot equilibrium of a duopoly where the market demand is P d(Q) =
maxf0; A   BQg and rmss constant marginal costs are (c1; c2) 2 R2+; the market
price PC ; the output QCi and prot 
C
i of rm i are
(PC ; QCi ;
C
i ) =
 
A+ c1 + c2
3
;
A  2ci + c3 i
3B
;
(A  2c1 + c2)2
9B
!
: (1)
If the market is monopolized by a single rm whose constant marginal cost is
c 2 R+, then the market equilibrium price PM ; output QM , and the rms prots
M are
(PM ; QM ;M) =
 
A+ c
2
;
A  c
2B
;
(A  c)2
4B
!
: (2)
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Using these formulae (1), we readily calculate the Latins market Cournot equi-
librium price pC , output qCi = q
C and prot Ci = 
C
L of rm i as
(pC ; qC ;CL) =

a
3
;
a
3b
;
a2
9b

: (3)
Using the formulae (2), we obtain the monopoly equilibrium price, output, and the
monopolys prot in the Latin market as
(pM ; qM ;ML ) =

a
2
;
a
2b
;
a2
4b

: (4)
Note that qM = 3
4
(2qC); i.e., in a monopoly the equilibrium output is 75% of the
output in a Cournot duopoly.
When aggregate output is q; the total surplus generated in the market is given by
S(q) =

A  Bq
2

q: (5)
In the Latin market, the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, SCL ; is therefore
SCL =
4a2
9b
; (6)
and the surplus at monopoly equilibrium, SML , is
SML =
3a2
8b
: (7)
Replacing a with  and b with  yields formulae analogous for the Cournot and
monopoly equilibria in the Greek market. (These formulae assume that rmscon-
stant marginal cost of production is zero). We use the notation C , C , CG; S
C
G , and
M ; M ;MG ; S
M
G ; for the values of output, price, prots and surplus at the symmetric
Cournot duopoly equilibrium, and monopoly equilibrium of the market, respectively.
3 Non-Market Based Transfer Pricing
Assume that the parent rms simultaneously decide the transfer prices they charge
to their subsidiaries, knowing that these rms will compete à la Cournot in the Greek
market; i.e., each parent rm i 2 f1; 2g sets its transfer price ti 2 R so as to maximize
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consolidated prots. (Of course, a parent rm may provide the good to a subsidiary
at a subsidized cost, which implies, since the unit cost is zero, that transfer prices
may be negative.) The equilibrium under this scheme of non-market based (NMB)
transfer pricing is determined as follows.
For (t1; t2), the equilibrium in the Greek market is that of a Cournot duopoly
where rmsconstant marginal costs are (t1; t2); i.e., the output of rm i 2 f1; 2g is
i = i (t1; t2) =
  2ti + t3 i
3
:
Thus, parent is solves the problem
max
(qi;ti)2R+R
i (q1; q2; 1 (t1; t2) ; 2 (t1; t2)) :
Since parent is choice of transfer prices ti does not a¤ect its revenue in the Latin
market, nor its output decisions in the Latin market qi a¤ect its revenue in the Greek
market, these two decisions can be treated independently; i.e., qi (ti) is chosen to
maximize revenue in the Latin (Greek) market. Thus, the equilibrium outcome in
the Latin market is just the Cournot equilibrium outcome.
We calculate the equilibrium outcome in the Greek market: since parent i chooses
its transfer price ti so as to maximize its subsidiarys revenue in the Greek market,
d (1 (t1; t2) + 2 (t1; t2)) i (t1; t2) : Hence, parent is reaction to the transfer price
set up by its competitor, t3 i; is
ri(t3 i) =  t3 i + 
4
:
Therefore, the equilibrium transfer prices are
t1 = t

2 =  

5
:
Substituting these values in the equation for i (t1; t2) and using (1) we get the sub-
sidiariesoutputs
1 (t

1; t

2) = 2 (t

1; t

2) =
2
5
=
6
5
C := NMB:
Hence the equilibrium price in the Greek market
d
 
2NMB

=

5
=
3
5
C := NMB:
8
Total prots are
NMBL +
NMB
G = p
CqC + NMBNMB (8)
= CL +
18
25
CG:
And total surplus is
SNMBL + S
NMB
G = S
C
L +

  
2
 
2NMB

2NMB (9)
= SCL +
27
25
SCG :
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under non-market based transfer pricing:
(1.1) The equilibrium output in the Latin market is the Cournot output, i.e.,
qNMB = qC :
(1.2) The equilibrium output in the Greek is above the Cournot output, i.e.,
NMB =
6
5
C :
(1.3) Firmsprots are
(NMBL ;
NMB
G ) = (
C
L ;
18
25
CG):
Hence, total prots are below their prots at the Cournot equilibria of these markets.
(1.4) The surpluses in the Latin and Greek markets are
(SNMBL ; S
NMB
G ) = (S
C
L ;
27
25
SCG):
Thus, the total surplus is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibria of these markets.
The strategic considerations behind this result are clear: delegating output deci-
sion to subsidiaries induces parents to compete more aggressively in the Greek market,
relative to a setting in which parents exercise direct control of the subsidiarys out-
put. By reducing its transfer price below marginal cost, parents attempt to gain a
kind of Stackelberg leader status, creating a short of prisonersdilemma situation.
As a consequence, the equilibrium outcome in the Greek market is more e¢ cient
than the Cournot outcome. Analogous results are found by Vickers (1985), Judd and
Fershtman (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Alles and Datar (1998).
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4 Market Based Transfer Pricing
In this section, we assume, consistently with the Arms Length Principle, that sub-
sidiaries buy the good from parents at the price at which the good trades in the Latin
market, which is known to the rms competing in the Greek market at the time of
making output decisions.4 In this setup, parents act as leaders anticipating the
reactions of subsidiary rms. The equilibrium under this scheme of market based
(MB) transfer pricing is determined as follows.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p  0; each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g
chooses its output i to solve the problem
max
i2R+
(d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Here p is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary rms. Using the formulae (1),
we calculate the equilibrium outputs and price for p  0 as
1 = 

2 = ^(p) =
  p
3
:
Parents, anticipating the outputs and price in the Greek market, choose their
output qi in order to solve
max
qi2R+
i
 
q1; q2; ^
 
pd(q1 + q2)

; ^
 
pd(q1 + q2)

:
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition for prot maxi-
mization of parents 1 and 2 we obtain their outputs,
q1 = q

2 =
(4b+ 9)a  b
b (8b+ 27)
:= qMB: (10)
The equilibrium price in the Latin market is
pd(2qMB) =
9a + 2b
8b+ 27
:= pMB:
4Dürr and Göx (2011) assume that rms can arbitrarily choose a transfer price from an allow-
able exogenous range of ALP prices, withstanding a possible examination of authorities in the two
markets. In the next section we consider a lax application of the ALP where e¤ective transfer prices
are determined endogenously.
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Substituting the value of pMB in equation ^(p) we obtain the equilibrium subsidiaries
outputs,
1 = 

2 = ^(p
MB) =
(2b+ 9)  3a
(8b+ 27)
:= MB: (11)
The equilibrium price in the Greek market is
d(2MB) =
6a + 4b + 9
8b+ 27
:= MB:
Note that for equilibrium to be interior we must have
(4b+ 9) a  4b > 0 () u > 1
4 + 9s
:= l(s);
and
(9 + 2b)  3a > 0 () u < 3 + 2
3s
:= g(s);
i.e.,
l(s) < u < g(s): (12)
The thin and thick curves in Figure 1 below are the graphs of the functions l and
g, respectively; equilibrium is interior for the parameter constellations (s; u) lying
between these curves. If u  l(s), then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 and
MB = (  a)=3. In this case, the high market price in the Latin market (p = a)
helps softening competition in the Greek market among subsidiaries. If u  g(s),
then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = qC and MB = 0: In this case, double
marginalization leads to a complete shut down of the Greek market.
Assuming that (12) holds, so that both markets are active, and using again (3),
we can rewrite the expression for rmsoutput in the Latin market (10) as
qMB = qC +
4
3 (8b+ 27)

u  3
4

:
Likewise, using the equations (3) and (4) we can write the expression for rmsoutput
in the Greek market (11) as
MB = C   9a + 2b
3 (8b+ 27)
=
M
2
  3
(8b+ 27)

u  3
4

:
Thus, under MB transfer pricing whether the output in the Latin market is above
or below the Cournot output (which is also their output under NMB pricing by
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Proposition 1) depends on the sing of u   3=4. This term is positive when the
maximum willingness to pay in Latin market relative to that in the Greek market is
su¢ ciently large (at least 75%), and it is negative otherwise. However, the output
in the Greek market is always below the Cournot output (and therefore, it is below
the output under NMB transfer pricing by Proposition 1). Note also that double
marginalization imposed by MB transfer pricing leads to an output in the Greek
market that is below the monopoly output when u > 3=4:
We have
@qMB
@
=   36
(8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

;
and
@MB
@b
=
24
(8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

:
Hence, the signs of these derivatives are also determined by the sing of u   3=4. If
u > 3=4; then the output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with
 (b). It is easy to see why: only if the willingness to pay in the Latin market is
su¢ ciently large relative to that of the Greek market (i.e., u > 3=4), it is worthwhile
responding to an increase of the Greek market size (i.e., a smaller ) with an increase
of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the transfer price and avoiding a
large reduction of the sales of the subsidiary.
The equilibrium output in the Latin market satises
lim
!0
qMB = qC +

6b

u  3
4

:= qMB0 ;
and
lim
!1
qMB = qC :
Thus, as the size of the Greek market becomes large (i.e.,  becomes small ), the
output in the Latin market is above or below the Cournot output depending on the
sign of u   3=4. If u > 3=4; then parents incentive to increase their output in order
to alleviate double marginalization remains as the size of the Greek market becomes
arbitrarily large. When u < 3=4, however, parents reduce their output in the Latin
market as a way to commit to high prices in the Greek market. Of course, as the size
of the Greek market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e.,  approaches innity), parents
tend to ignore the double marginalization problem (as the prots in this market
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become negligible), and focus on the impact on their output decision on the Latin
market, and their output approaches the Cournot output, independently of the sign
of u  3=4:
The equilibrium output in the Greek market satises
lim
b!1
MB =
M
2
;
and
lim
b!0
MB = C   a
9
=
M
2
  
9

u  3
4

:= MB0 :
Thus, as the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e., b approaches
innity), the revenues in this market become negligible, and parents output decisions
mainly serve the purpose of committing to high prices in the Greek market.
Interestingly, MB transfer pricing allow parents to attain perfect cooperation
(i.e., they are able to sustain the monopoly outcome) when b approaches innity.
In this case, MB transfer pricing is merely an instrument to avoid competition in
the Greek market. When the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily large
(i.e., b approaches zero), however, revenues mainly come from the Latin market and
therefore, parents tend to ignore the impact of double marginalization in the Greek
market, producing the Cournot output in the Latin market. Double marginalization
leads to an output below the Cournot output, and has its worst e¤ects when u > 3=4,
in which case output falls even below the monopoly output.
We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Under market based transfer pricing:
(2.1) If equilibrium is interior, i.e., 1=(4+9s) < u < 3+2=3s; the output in the Latin
market qMB is above or below the Cournot outcome, and decreases or increases with
the size of the Greek market ; depending on whether u is above or below 3=4, i.e.,
qMB R qC and @q
MB
@
S 0 if and only if u T 3
4
;
and the output in the Greek market MB is below the Cournot outcome, and increases
or decreases with the size of the Latin market b; depending on whether u is above or
below 3=4, i.e.,
MB < C and
@MB
@b
T 0 if and only if u T 3
4
:
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Further, as  becomes large qMB approaches qC ; and as  becomes small qMB ap-
proaches qMB0 ; where q
MB
0 T qC whenever u T 3=4: And as b becomes large MB
approaches M=2; and as b becomes small MB approaches MB0 < 
C ; where MB0 T
M=2 whenever u S 3=4:
(2.2) If u  1=(4+9s), then equilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 and MB = ( a)=3.
And if u  3 + 2=3s, then equilibrium outputs are qMB = qC and MB = 0:
Let us study the prot under MB transfer pricing. In an interior equilibrium rms
total prots can be calculated using (8) as
MBL +
MB
G = 
NMB
L +
NMB
G +
b22 
64b2 + 432b2 + 7293
;
where
 =  

30s2 +
64
9
s

u2 +
 
8s+ 36s2

u+
567
25
s2 +
436
25
s+
72
25
:
Write
 (s) =
810s2 + 180s+
p
2 (24 + 81s)
p
155s2 + 36s
10s (135s+ 32)
:
for the value of u that solves  = 0 given s: Then we have  R 0; and therefore
MBL +
MB
G R NMBL +NMBG ; whenever u Q  (s) :
The dashed curve in Figure 1 is the graph of the function . The thin and thick
curves are the graphs of the functions l and g; respectively.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
s
u
Figure 1. Total prots under MB and NMB transfer pricing.
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Recall that for equilibrium to be interior the values of s and u must lie between
these two curves. Note  is decreasing in s and
lim
s!1
(s) =
3
5
 
1 +
p
310
10
!
:= 1 ' 1:6564:
Thus, when equilibrium is interior and u is below 1 total prots under MB transfer
pricing are greater than under NMB transfer pricing even if the size of the Greek
market is small relative to that of the Latin market (i.e., s is large).
We examine total prots at corner equilibria. When u  g(s), then rmsequi-
librium outputs are qMB = qC = qNMB and MB = 0 < NMB. Hence total prots
are
MBL +
MB
G = 
NMB
L + 0 < 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
When u  l(s), then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 < qNMB and MB =
( a)
3
< C < NMB. Hence total prots are
MBG = 
NMB
L +
NMB
G +
2^
225
;
where
^ = 7  25u (2u+ su  1) :
Hence, we have ^ R 0; and therefore MBL +MBG R NMBL +NMBG ; whenever
u S 5 +
p
28s+ 81
20 + 10s
:= ^(s):
Since
l(s)  ^(s) < 0;
for all s; then u  l(s) implies
u < ^(s);
and therefore
MBL +
MB
G > 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
Thus, in the corner equilibria that arise when the willingness to pay in the Latin
market relative to that of the Greek market u is small (i.e., when u  l(s) < 1=4)
rmstotal prots under MB transfer pricing are greater than under NMB, whereas
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in the corner equilibria that arise when u is large (i.e., when u  g(s) > 3), rms
total prots under MB transfer pricing are smaller than under NMB transfer pricing.
In summary, for parameter constellations (s; u) that lie below (above) the graph
of  (the dashed curve in Figure 1) rms prots under MB transfer pricing are above
(below) their prots under NMB transfer pricing. Proposition 3 summarizes our
results.5
Proposition 3. Total prots under MB transfer pricing are above or below total
prots under NMB transfer pricing depending on whether u is above or below (s);
i.e.,
MBL +
MB
G R NMBL +NMBG () u Q  (s) :
In particular, if u < 1 ' 1:6564; then total prots under MB transfer pricing are
above total prots under NMB transfer pricing.
Let us study the total surplus under MB transfer pricing. In an interior equilib-
rium we calculate the surplus in the Latin market under MB transfer pricing using
equation (5) as
SMBL = S
NMB
L +
8 (27a + b (4a+ 3))
9 (8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

:
Therefore SMBL T SNMBL whenever u T 3=4: Using again equation (5), we calculate
the surplus in the Greek market under MB transfer pricing as
SMBG = S
NMB
G  
6
25
(5a +  (2b+ 3)) (15a + 2 (7b+ 18))
 (8b+ 27)2
:
Hence SMBG < S
NMB
G :
Thus, in an interior equilibrium the comparison of total surplus under MB and
NMB transfer pricing is as follows: if u  3=4; then the surplus under MB transfer
pricing is below the surplus under NMB transfer pricing in both markets, and there-
fore so is total surplus, i.e., SMBL + S
MB
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G . If u > 3=4, then we have
SMBL > S
NMB
L ; but S
MB
G < S
NMB
G : Thus, the comparison of the total surplus under
5In addition, it can be shown that MBL > 
NMB
L if 6=27s+ 16 < u < 3=4; and 
MB
L < 
NMB
L
otherwise. Likewise MBG Q NMBG i¤ u R 2110 +
2
5s .
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MB and NMB transfer pricing is ambiguous. We have
SMBL + S
MB
G = S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G +
2b22 S
225 (8b+ 27)2
;
where
S = 25s (27s+ 16)u2   2700s (3s+ 1)u  2916s2   3303s  756:
Write
 (s) =
4050s2 + 15 (27s+ 8)
p
7s (16s+ 3) + 1350s
400s+ 675s2
:
for the solution to the equation S = 0 given s. Hence S R 0; and therefore SMBL +
SMBG R SNMBL + SNMBG ; whenever u R  (s).
The dashed curve is Figure 2 is the graph of the function . (Here again the thin
and thick curves in Figure 2 are the graphs of the functions l and g; respectively.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
5
10
15
20
s
u
Figure 2. Total welfare under MB and NMB transfer pricing.
Recall that equilibrium is interior under MB transfer pricing for parameter con-
stellations (s; u) lying between these two curves.) The minimum value of  is  =
27
20
p
7+6 ' 9:5718. Thus, for u <  the total surplus under MB transfer pricing is be-
low the total surplus under NMB transfer pricing. Only for parameter constellations
(s; u) satisfying (s) < u < g(s) we have
SMBL + S
MB
G > S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
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As Figure 2 illustrates, these parameter constellations involve a large willingness to
pay in the Latin market relative to that of the Greek market u (larger that 249=25 '
9:96), and a small size of the Greek market relative to that of the Latin marker s
(smaller than 25=261 ' :095), and form a small subset of the parameter space.
Let us examine the total surplus at corner equilibria. If u  g(s), then rms
equilibrium outputs are qMB = qC = qNMB and MB = 0 < NMB, and the total
surplus satises
SMBL + S
MB
G = S
NMB
L + 0 < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
If u  l(s); then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 < qNMB and MB = ( a)
3
<
C < NMB. Hence SMBL = 0 and S
MB
G < S
NMB
G : Therefore
SMBL + S
MB
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
Thus, in every corner equilibrium the total surplus under MB transfer pricing is below
the total surplus under NMB transfer pricing.
The total surplus under MB transfer pricing is below the total surplus under
NMB transfer pricing except for the small set of parameter constellations (s; u) in
the area below the graph of g and above the graph of ; i.e., for (s; u) satisfying
(s) < u < g(s). As Figure 2 illustrates, for these parameter constellations the
increment in surplus due to the increment in output in the Latin market under MB
transfer pricing relative to that under NMB transfer pricing, qMB > qC = qNMB;
more than compensates the reduction in surplus due to the reduction of the output
in the Greek market, MB < C < NMB. Proposition 4 states these results.
Proposition 4. The total surplus under MB transfer pricing is typically smaller
than under NMB transfer pricing. Specically, only if (s; u) satises
(s) < u < g(s)
is the total surplus under MB transfer pricing larger than under NMB transfer pric-
ing; this condition requires that the maximum willingness to pay in the Latin market
relative to that of the Greek market u be large (larger than 9.95) and the size of the
Latin market relative to that of the Greek market s be small (smaller than 0.095).
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MB transfer pricing provides parent rms with an instrument to limit aggressive
competition in the Greek market, and may allow them to induce an outcome near
the monopoly outcome when the size of the Greek market relative to that of the
Latin market is large. Of course, since a parent inuences its transfer price only via
its output decision in the Latin market, competition in this market may be more
aggressive than under NMB transfer pricing, provided the maximum willingness to
pay in this market is not too small compare to that of the Greek market. For some
parameter constellations, total prot under MB transfer pricing is above that under
NMB transfer pricing. Thus, under quantity competition the Arms Length Principle
may provide a rational for vertical separation. However, total surplus under MB
transfer pricing is typically below that under NMB transfer pricing, which raises
some questions about the use of the ALP as a guideline for regulating transfer prices.
5 Market-Based Transfer Pricing with Discounts
In order to discuss the consequences of a lax application of the ALP, we consider an
alternative setting where transfer prices are market based, but parents apply discounts
to their subsidiaries. Such practices are common. Baldenius, Melumad, and Reichel-
stein (2004) argued that this is a frequent practice, which is justied due to cost
di¤erences between internal and external transactions. Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2006) examine U.S. international export transaction between 1993 and 2000, and
nd that the prices of U.S. exports are substantially larger than the transfer prices
for their subsidiaries the wedge between the market prices and related-party prices
is negatively correlated with destination-country corporate tax rates, and positively
correlated with both destination-country import tari¤s and other characteristics in-
dicating greater market power. Baldenius and Reichelstein (2005) also cite a few
examples of rms adjusting prevailing market prices for internal transfers. Of course,
failure to comply with the Arms Length Principle may result in penalties, which
rms may have to optimally trade o¤. We abstract away from penalties, and focus
our analysis on the strategic consequences of a lax application of the ALP.
In our setting, each parent rm chooses simultaneously its output in the Latin
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market as well as the discount that will apply to its subsidiary.6 Then each subsidiary,
knowing the price in the Latin market, its own discount and that of its rival, competes
in quantities in the Greek market. The equilibrium under this scheme of market based
transfer pricing with discounts (MBD) is determined as follows.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+ and discounts are (1; 2) 2
R2+, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses its output i to solve the problem
max
i2R+
(d (1 + 2)  (p  i))i;
Here the term p  i is the constant marginal cost of subsidiary i. Using the formula
(1), we calculate the equilibrium outputs in the Greek market as a function of the
price in the Latin market and the parentsdiscounts, which are given by
i = ~i(p; 1; 2) =
  p+ 2i   3 i
3
:
Parent rm i, anticipating the outputs and market price in the Greek market,
chooses its outputs qi and its discount i in order to solve the problem
max
(qi;2)2R2+
i
 
q1; q2; ~1
 
pd(q1 + q2); 1; 2

; ~2
 
pd(q1 + q2); 1; 2

:
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order conditions for prot max-
imization of parents 1 and 2 we obtain their outputs and discounts in an interior
equilibrium. In the Latin market, parentsoutputs are
q1 = q

2 =
a
3b
  
15
:= qMBD;
and the market price is
pd(2qNMD) =
a
3
+
2
15
b

:= pMBD: (13)
Equilibrium discounts are
1 = 

2 =
5a + 2b + 3
15
:= : (14)
6Arya and Mittendorf (2008) analyze transfer pricing policy as a strategic response to external
competition in a similar setting. In their model, however, discounts are set prior to the stage of
competition in the Latin market.
20
Thus, transfer prices are given by
pMBD    =  
5
:
Note that transfer prices are negative, i.e., transfer prices are below marginal cost.
Substituting these values in equation above, we obtain the subsidiariesoutputs
~i
 
pMBD; ; 

=
2
5


:= MBD:
The market price in the Greek market is
d(2MBD) =

5
:= MBD:
For equilibrium to be interior we must have
a

>
b
5
;
i.e.,
u > h(s) :=
1
5s
: (15)
If u  h(s); then in equilibrium is qMBD = 0 and MBD = 2
5


:
The solid curve in Figure 3 below is the graph of the function h; the area above the
graph of h corresponds to the parameter constellations (s; u) for which the equilibrium
is interior.
Using again (3) and (10), we can rewrite the expression for rmsoutput in the
Latin market as
qMBD = qC   1
5
C ;
and the output in the Greek market as
MBD =
6
5
C :
Since qNMB = qC and NMB = 6
5
C by Proposition 1, then qMBD < qNMB and
MBD = NMB; that is, under MBD transfer pricing the output in the Latin (Greek)
market is below (equal to) the output under NMB transfer pricing.
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Figure 3. Total prots under MBD and NMB transfer pricing.
Discounts open up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the Greek
market, and bring back a prisoners dilemma analogous to that rms face under NMB
transfer pricing. Under MBD transfer pricing, however, parents output decisions
in the two markets are not independent: a parent by reducing its output in the
Latin market and simultaneously increasing its discount, rises the marginal cost of its
subsidiarys rival without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its own subsidiary. Therefore,
linking the cost of its subsidiarys rivals to the price in the Latin market makes
competition more aggressive in the Greek market and less aggressive in the Latin
market. In fact, when condition (15) does not hold, parents choose to completely
shot down the Latin market. Note that a parents incentive to reduce its output in
order to increase the transfer price of its subsidiarys rival increases with both the
maximum willingness to pay and the size of the Greek market relative to those of the
Latin market. These results are stated in Proposition 5.7
7Although less interesting, one may compare the output under MBD and MB transfer pric-
ing. Since qMB R qC if and only if u T 3=4 by Proposition 2, then qMBD < qMB and
qMB > qMBD whenever u > 3=4: When u < 3=4; however, qMB > qMBD. Likewise, proposi-
tions 1 and 2 and the results above imply MBD > MB .
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Proposition 5. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, the output in
the Greek market is
MBD =
6
5
C = NMB:
Moreover, if u > 1=5s; then the output in the Latin market is
qMBD = qC   1
5
C < qNMB;
and approaches qCas  becomes large and/or  becomes small, and if u  1=5s; then
qMBD = 0.
Let us study the prots under MBD transfer pricing. If u > h(s), then equilibrium
is interior and we can calculate rms prots in the Latin market under MBD transfer
pricing using (8) as
MBDL = 
NMB
L +
2
45

u  2
5s

= NMBL +
2
45
(u  2h(s)) :
Since, MBDG = 
NMB
G ; we have 
MBD
L + 
MBD
G S NMBL + NMBG if and only if
u S 2h(s).
If u  h(s); then in equilibrium qMBD = 0 < qNMBD and MBD = 2
5


= NMB:
Hence
MBDL +
MBD
G = 0 + 
NMB
G < 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
Therefore MBDL + 
MBD
G < 
NMB
L + 
NMB
G if and only if u < 2h(s): The dashed
curve in Figure 3 is the graph of the function 2h: Parameter constellations (s; u) that
lie above (below) this curve correspond to those for which total prot under MBD
transfer pricing is greater (less than or equal) the total prots under NMB transfer
pricing. This result is established in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, the total prots
are above (below) total prots under non-market based transfer pricing whenever u is
above (below) 2h(s).
Finally, we study the total surplus under MBD transfer pricing. If equilibrium is
interior, i.e., if u > h(s); then the surplus in the Latin market is
SMBDL = S
NMB
L  
2
45
2


u+
1
5s

:
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Hence, SMBDL < S
NMB
L : Since S
MBD
G = S
NMB
G , we have
SMBDL + S
MBD
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G ;
In a corner equilibrium, i.e., when u  h(s); we have qMBD = 0 < qNMB and
MBD = (6=5)C = NMB; and therefore
SMBDL + S
MBD
G = 0 + S
NMB
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
Hence the total surplus under MBD transfer pricing is unambiguously below the total
surplus under NMB transfer pricing. This result is stated in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, the total surplus
is unambiguously below the total surplus under non-market based transfer pricing.
In summary, market based transfer pricing with discounts generates a subtle link
between markets that softens competition in the home market as each parent attempts
to increase the transfer price of its subsidiarys rivals in order to gain a competitive
advantage in the external market.
6 Conclusions
While a regulatory policy requiring that transfer prices be consistent with the Arms
Length Principle does not a¤ect market outcomes under perfect competition, in im-
perfectly competitive markets with vertically separated rms it modies the strate-
gic nature of rms interactions and ultimately has an impact on market outcomes.
Specically, the application of the ALP serves as a commitment device that softens
competition. When the ALP is applied rigorously, the result is a softer competition
in the subsidiaries (external) market that is not compensated by a more aggressive
competition in the parents (home) market. A more lax application of the ALP softens
competition on the home market. Interestingly, vertical separation, an organizational
structure whose motivation is not well understood in the absence of frictions, may be
justied under transfer pricing policies based on the ALP.
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